In paragraph 263, paragraph 1, it states, among other things, that «when a request for a motor vehicle accident is made against the defendant, the defendant may process the claim for a car accident and any procedure relating to the claim for a car accident to the extent that the defendant deems it appropriate, including – (a) the tally or risk of the allegation of injury.» This can therefore be compared to the mib for unsured drivers. Nevertheless, legal proceedings (in cases of uninsured vehicles against Nominstan and the uninsured person (s. 272 (2) May 2019) or in cases of unidentified vehicles can only be brought against the nominal defendant (s. 272 (3) May 2019)). However, a mandatory conference must be held between the parties before an applicant presents a case that may contain a mediator. This does not guarantee regulation, although each participant is «obliged to actively participate in an attempt to settle the right to road accidents» (section 262, paragraph 1, paragraph b) maya 2019). Unlike in the United Kingdom, there is no arbitration hearing for victims of un prosecuted drivers, which means that the complainant is not responsible for proving an error of law to succeed in court. As a result, there is an additional level of transparency because arbitration procedures are not made public. This would be particularly beneficial for victims of unidentified drivers compared to the UK. However, this could be a cost problem. If a right is settled in the event of arbitration, it would obviously be cheaper than court proceedings. In addition, the application of the courts may constitute a challenge because of the time required to determine the results of claims. Accordingly, it is argued that the current approach to claims is not entirely satisfactory, but that a radical review must be carefully defined in terms of time and costs.
Overall, it seems that the legislative approach is an interesting alternative, but should not be taken lightly. There are several factors to consider and it seems that some of the challenges highlighted in this article could be met by greater transparency in the operation of the mib. The Mib should consider increasing the transparency of claims as a whole, with more detailed information on how claims are handled, all claims arising from the handling of claims and how the law applies to claims received. The United Kingdom could take Fos` example in terms of the details of the claims. This would enhance transparency and control of mib. However, the Mib should consult on the details to be provided and take more account of the potential costs and administrative burden. Legislation could also be introduced, as is currently the case for Fos yours. If you keep in mind that Section 6, paragraph 1 of Section 2015 2015 does not authorize sub-rogatory claims, the application of an exclusion clause could therefore mean that another insurer can compensate the claim and cannot deduct it (see example. B Bristol Alliance Partnership/Williams  ewca Civ 1267). See also below for restrictions on mib agreements in relation to rights under the insurance policy.
As has already been said, the differences between the treatment of victims are limited to some extent by EU legislation. Therefore, the elimination of a means could result in victims having less opportunity to challenge the agreements. However, it is also interesting to note that the restrictions and differences between the treatment of victims with the UK were under EU jurisdiction. Indeed, the High Court in Roadpeace challenged a violation of EU law with regard to a time clause in the previous UtDA 2003,128, by definition: 129 This means that legal action by the European UNION has not always prevented differences in the treatment of victims.130 has certainly enabled victims to challenge the agreements for violation of EU law in the courts, with some successes such as delaney and Evans.